By Okechukwu Nwanguma
President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s declaration of a nationwide security emergency and his call for constitutional amendments to enable states that desire State Police to establish them have once again thrust Nigeria into one of its most contentious constitutional and governance debates.
The President announced several measures, including the recruitment of 50,000 police officers, deployment of forest guards, support for state-backed security initiatives, and the withdrawal of police officers from unauthorised VIP protection duties. However, the most consequential aspect of his address was his endorsement of the State Police.
The debate has now moved beyond abstract arguments. The National Assembly is considering the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Alteration) (State Police) Bill, 2026, a far-reaching proposal that seeks to establish a dual policing structure consisting of a Federal Police Service and State Police Services.
This represents perhaps the most comprehensive constitutional effort since the return to democratic rule to restructure policing in Nigeria.
The proposal deserves careful consideration. It also demands rigorous scrutiny.
The question is no longer whether Nigeria should have State Police. The real question is whether the proposed constitutional framework can strengthen security without undermining democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
*The Failure of Centralised Policing*
Nigeria’s current policing structure is a product of history.
Pre-colonial systems of social control relied largely on communal accountability and restorative approaches to justice. Colonial administration introduced a coercive model of policing designed primarily to protect the state rather than serve communities. At independence, Nigeria operated both federal and regional police forces.
The military coup of 1966 abolished regional police, citing abuse and political manipulation by regional governments. Subsequent decades of military rule further centralised and militarised policing.
Today, the Nigeria Police Force remains one of the most centralised policing institutions in the world.
The consequences are visible everywhere.
Banditry continues to devastate communities in the North-West. Terrorism persists in the North-East. Kidnapping has become a national industry. Violent crime, cultism, communal conflicts, and separatist-related violence have stretched security institutions beyond capacity.
The centralised command structure is often slow, bureaucratic, disconnected from local realities, and unable to respond effectively to rapidly evolving security threats.
These realities have strengthened calls for decentralisation.
*The Appeal of State Police*
Advocates argue that State Police would:
– Bring policing closer to the people;
– Improve local intelligence gathering;
– Enhance community trust;
– Increase responsiveness;
– Reflect the principles of federalism;
– Reduce overdependence on Abuja.
These arguments are compelling.
Security challenges are fundamentally local. Effective policing requires knowledge of local cultures, languages, terrain, and community dynamics.
The proposed constitutional amendment recognises this reality.
Unlike earlier proposals, however, the 2026 State Police Bill attempts to establish constitutional guardrails intended to prevent abuse.
*What the Bill Gets Right*
From a human rights and rule of law perspective, several provisions deserve commendation.
First, the Bill rejects absolute state control of policing.
State Police Services would remain subject to the Constitution, national minimum standards, independent oversight mechanisms, judicial review, and, in exceptional circumstances, federal intervention.
Second, Section 215(7) contains one of the strongest constitutional protections against political misuse of policing ever proposed in Nigeria. It expressly prohibits governors from directing State Police to target political opponents, suppress lawful political activity, engage in ethnic or religious persecution, or violate constitutional rights.
This provision directly addresses one of the most persistent fears surrounding State Police.
Third, Section 214(10) authorises federal intervention where a State Police Service is being used for systematic human rights violations, electoral intimidation, ethnic persecution, religious discrimination, or constitutional obstruction.
This is a significant safeguard against the emergence of governor-controlled coercive institutions.
Fourth, the Bill subjects federal intervention itself to judicial review. Courts may examine the legality, scope, duration, and conduct of such interventions. This helps prevent federal authorities from abusing intervention powers for partisan purposes.
Fifth, the Bill creates State Police Service Commissions with authority over recruitment, promotions, discipline, and dismissals. It also grants these commissions a measure of independence from governors.
Finally, the Bill requires national minimum standards on recruitment, training, vetting, discipline, firearms use, accountability, complaints systems, and public reporting.
These provisions demonstrate a conscious effort to learn from both Nigeria’s history and international experience.
*The Danger of Decentralising Abuse*
Despite these safeguards, serious concerns remain.
Nigeria’s problem has never been merely the absence of institutions. It has often been the capture of institutions.
Governors already exercise enormous influence over state assemblies, local governments, state electoral commissions, and, in many cases, state judiciaries.
The concern is therefore not simply whether constitutional safeguards exist on paper, but whether they can withstand the realities of executive dominance.
Many Nigerians remember how regional police forces were allegedly misused before the military intervention of 1966.
More recently, state-backed security outfits have generated similar concerns.
The experience of Ebubeagu in parts of the South-East, allegations against some regional security outfits in other parts of the country, and recurring reports of political interference in local security structures demonstrate that fears about State Police are not imaginary.
They are grounded in experience.
Without effective safeguards, State Police could become instruments for:
– Electoral manipulation;
– Political intimidation;
– Suppression of dissent;
– Harassment of journalists and activists;
– Ethnic profiling;
– Enforcement of partisan interests.
The risk is that Nigeria could replace one centralised policing problem with thirty-six localised policing problems.
*Gaps in the Proposed Bill*
While the Bill contains important safeguards, it leaves several critical issues unresolved.
First, it does not sufficiently guarantee independent civilian oversight.
There is no constitutional requirement for independent civilian complaints boards, citizen review panels, or community accountability structures.
Professional oversight alone is insufficient. Democratic policing requires public oversight.
Second, the Bill does not adequately address diversity and inclusion.
In deeply plural societies, State Police recruitment and deployment should reflect the diversity of the populations they serve.
Without constitutional safeguards for minorities, policing may be perceived as serving dominant ethnic, religious, or political interests.
Third, funding remains a major concern.
Many states already struggle to pay salaries and finance essential public services.
Professional policing requires substantial investment in training, welfare, forensic capacity, communications, logistics, technology, and accountability mechanisms.
Poorly funded State Police Services may become vulnerable to corruption, extortion, political capture, and criminal infiltration.
Fourth, some of the triggers for federal intervention remain open to subjective interpretation.
Terms such as “actual or imminent breakdown,” “unable or unwilling,” and “substantial threat to national security” require careful legislative definition to prevent abuse.
*Beyond State Police: The Governance Question*
The debate over State Police sometimes assumes that insecurity is fundamentally a policing problem.
It is not.
Security is ultimately produced by justice, inclusion, opportunity, and accountable governance.
Countries do not become secure merely because they have more police agencies.
The United States has thousands of policing agencies, yet continues to struggle with gun violence and serious crime.
Security is strongest where institutions work, citizens trust government, and socio-economic conditions reduce incentives for violence.
Nigeria’s Constitution already outlines the foundations of sustainable security under Chapter II.
These include:
– Education;
– Employment;
– Healthcare;
– Social welfare;
– Housing;
– Democratic participation;
– Local government autonomy.
Unfortunately, these constitutional objectives remain largely unrealised.
Poverty, unemployment, inequality, corruption, exclusion, and impunity continue to fuel insecurity across the country.
No policing model—whether centralised or decentralised—can succeed in isolation from broader governance reforms.
*What Nigeria Should Do*
If Nigeria proceeds with State Police, several additional safeguards should be incorporated before the final passage of the Bill.
These include:
– Independent Police Complaints Authorities at federal and state levels;
– Mandatory public reporting on arrests, detentions, use of force, deaths in custody, and complaints;
– Constitutional guarantees for diversity and minority representation;
– Strong whistleblower protections;
– Reduced gubernatorial influence over State Police Service Commissions;
– Democratic State Security Boards involving civil society, labour, professional bodies, traditional institutions, women, youth, and community representatives;
– Robust legislative and judicial oversight;
– Full compliance with international human rights obligations.
Equally important, the Federal Police Service itself must undergo reform.
Decentralisation should not become an excuse to avoid restructuring the existing police architecture.
State, Area, and Divisional Commands require greater operational and administrative autonomy. Police welfare, training, accountability, and professionalism must improve nationwide.
*A Moment of Opportunity—and a Moment of Danger*
The State Police Bill represents a significant constitutional milestone.
Unlike earlier proposals, it acknowledges many of the dangers associated with decentralisation and attempts to build safeguards against abuse.
That deserves recognition.
Yet the ultimate test of the Bill is not whether it creates State Police. The test is whether it creates democratic policing.
Nigeria stands at a crossroads.
We can decentralise policing in ways that deepen accountability, improve security, strengthen federalism, and enhance citizens’ rights.
Or we can decentralise coercive power and create thirty-six new centres of abuse.
The choice is not between Federal Police and State Police.
The choice is between democratic policing and politicised policing.
Civil society, legislators, the legal profession, human rights defenders, and citizens must therefore insist that any constitutional amendment establishing State Police incorporates the strongest possible safeguards for liberty, accountability, professionalism, and the rule of law.
Nigeria does not merely need more police.
Nigeria needs policing that protects both security and freedom.
Mr Okechukwu Nwanguma is the Executive Director of the Rule of Law and Accountability Advocacy Centre (RULAAC)
