The Supreme Court, in Uku v. Uku (2025) 21 NWLR (Pt. 2023) 79, has upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal, affirming that reliance on the Qur’an and Hadith as primary sources of Islamic law is valid in determining disputes relating to paternity and marriage under Sharia law.
The case arose from a marital dispute between the appellant and the respondent, who were married under Islamic law through a Nikah contract.
The respondent alleged that from the first night of the marriage, the appellant refused to allow him exercise conjugal rights. He reportedly complained to her parents, who advised the appellant to allow the respondent exercise his marital rights, but she allegedly refused. The respondent later returned the appellant to her parents after observing that she was vomiting and subsequently embarked on a pilgrimage to Mecca. Upon his return, he declined to take her back and instead demanded a refund of his dowry.
Approximately eight months after the marriage, the appellant gave birth to a baby girl and claimed the respondent was the father. The respondent denied paternity, maintaining that he never had sexual relations with the appellant. The appellant subsequently instituted a suit at a Sharia trial court seeking traditional rites associated with childbirth, including Kauri and Yanka. During the proceedings, both parties agreed to swear the oath of Li’an, also known as mutual imprecation, after its implications were explained to them. The trial court dissolved the marriage and granted custody of the child to the appellant.
Dissatisfied with the ruling, the appellant appealed to the Upper Sharia Court, which allowed the appeal, holding that the child was born within eight months of the marriage and therefore within the gestation period recognised under Islamic law. The respondent then appealed to the Sharia Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal. Still aggrieved, he approached the Court of Appeal, which set aside the decision of the Upper Sharia Court, holding that the oath of Li’an was valid and sufficient to rebut the presumption of paternity.
The appellant further appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Court of Appeal erred by relying solely on the Qur’an and Hadith without reference to any specific Islamic school of thought.
In a unanimous judgment dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Qur’an and Hadith remain the primary sources of Islamic law and should be relied upon before consulting any school of thought. The apex court stated that schools of Islamic jurisprudence derive their authority from these primary sources and should only be consulted where there is ambiguity or absence of direct guidance in the Qur’an or Hadith.
The court also clarified that Nikah under Islamic law is a contractual marriage between a Muslim man and a Muslim woman and reaffirmed that Islamic law permits a man to marry up to four wives, provided fairness and equality are maintained. It further noted that Islamic teachings elevate the status of a woman in marriage, recognising her as a partner entitled to retain her dowry as personal property and requiring her consent as a condition for a valid marriage.
On the issue of consummation, the court explained that where a husband and wife seclude themselves, there is a presumption that the marriage has been consummated, although such presumption is rebuttable. The court held that the respondent successfully rebutted the presumption by subscribing to the oath of Li’an, which discharged him from responsibility for the paternity of the child.
The apex court also clarified that under Islamic law, a child born within the subsistence of a valid marriage is presumed legitimate, but this presumption can be overturned if the husband promptly denies paternity through Li’an. It explained that Li’an involves mutual oaths invoking divine curse by both spouses where allegations of adultery or denial of paternity arise and result in automatic and irrevocable dissolution of the marriage.
The court emphasised that while Li’an frees the husband from paternity and shields the wife from allegations of adultery, the child is regarded under Sharia law as belonging to the mother and is not considered illegitimate.
In a notable pronouncement, Justice Umar, delivering part of the judgment, highlighted the relevance of DNA testing in modern paternity disputes. He stated that although Li’an is recognised under Islamic law, medical expert evidence based on DNA testing could assist courts in resolving such disputes without undermining Islamic injunctions. He expressed hope that Islamic scholars would continue to explore ways to integrate contemporary scientific methods into Islamic jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court further held that the Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence is the applicable Muslim law in Area Courts and reaffirmed that Islamic law is distinct from customary law, as it is not tied to any particular tribe.
The court also reiterated that arguments of counsel cannot replace evidence on record, noting that there was no proof supporting the appellant’s claim that the respondent was aware of her pregnancy but failed to deny it earlier.
With these findings, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision validating the oath of Li’an and its legal consequences under Islamic law.
