By Okechukwu Nwanguma
For years, insecurity in the Southeast has been reduced to a simplistic and convenient narrative: IPOB is responsible for everything.
This single story has dominated government pronouncements, media headlines, and public debates. Yet a closer look reveals a far more complex reality – one involving state-created militias, criminal opportunists, political rivals, external forces, and the state itself.
It is a layered crisis, and until we confront this complexity with honesty, peace will remain elusive.
*The Rise of External Armed Groups and Unanswered Questions*
One of the most troubling developments has been the emergence of private militias and self-styled “military companies” claiming to operate with federal approval. For instance, Asari Dokubo’s open boast that he runs a private military outfit allegedly engaged by the federal government raises serious questions:
– Who authorised such an arrangement?
– How and from where were arms procured?
– Under what legal framework can an individual operate a private army in Nigeria?
– What role did such groups play in the Southeast – already a fragile and volatile space?
None of these questions has been credibly answered. Yet these same actors appeared on the scene during periods of repression, raids, and controversial security operations. This opacity breeds suspicion, and suspicion deepens insecurity.
*Ebubeagu: State-Created but Poorly Regulated*
Ebubeagu was conceived as a community-based security outfit by Southeast governors. In reality, its activities quickly became associated with allegations of extrajudicial killings, torture, village raids, and even rape. Communities in Imo, Ebonyi and elsewhere reported cases of unrestrained violence and politically motivated operations carried out under the cover of “security enforcement.”
The outfit’s composition – reportedly including external actors and poorly vetted recruits – only heightened concerns. In some states, courts ordered its disbandment after confirming credible evidence of abuse. With no transparency on recruitment, command structure, or oversight, Ebubeagu increasingly resembled the very threat it was meant to counter.
*The Enigma of “Unknown Gunmen”*
Few terms illustrate the confusion around Southeast insecurity more than “unknown gunmen.” It serves as an all-purpose label, vague enough to encompass criminal gangs, political mercenaries, rogue security operatives, and opportunistic non-state actors.
Was the term used to avoid rigorous investigation?
To shield certain actors from exposure?
Or simply as a lazy shorthand for a complex mix of criminal and political violence?
Regardless of the motive, the effect is the same: impunity. When perpetrators are “unknown,” no one is held accountable, and communities remain trapped in fear.
*IPOB: From Political Agitation to a Fragmented Space*
It bears repeating that IPOB began as a political movement anchored in historical grievances – marginalisation, leadership failure, and exclusion. A vacuum created by selfish and irresponsible political elites made the group attractive to frustrated young people abandoned by both state and federal authorities.
The federal government’s refusal to engage constructively and its overwhelming reliance on military force produced predictable consequences. Repression radicalised parts of the movement, fractured its internal structure, and created fertile ground for criminal gangs to operate under the guise of Biafra agitation.
Meanwhile, IPOB repeatedly distanced itself from violent actors like Simon Ekpa. But in public discourse, these distinctions vanished: every attack, every kidnapping, every shooting was attributed to IPOB – even when evidence was weak or non-existent. The result was a public narrative shaped more by convenience than by fact.
Dialogue was abandoned. Brute force was elevated. And in that environment, extremism and criminality thrived.
*The Gulak Assassination: A Case Study in Premature Blame*
The killing of Ahmed Gulak in Owerri exposed a recurring problem: premature attribution. Almost immediately, the police announced that IPOB was responsible. The Abba Kyari-led IRT paraded the corpses of unidentified men, claiming they were IPOB members “neutralised” for the assassination.
The public accepted this narrative – until contradictions emerged between Governor Hope Uzodinma and Senator Rochas Okorocha, pointing toward a political undercurrent. The episode revealed a troubling pattern: security agencies often assign blame first and investigate later – if they ever do. What is politically convenient takes precedence over what is factual.
Such conduct erodes trust and obstructs justice.
*What the Southeast Needs Now*
Resolving the Southeast crisis requires more than propaganda or selective storytelling. It demands evidence, honesty, and leadership.
1. Independent investigations into state-linked militias, private armed outfits, and questionable security operations.
2. Transparency and accountability in the establishment, oversight, and activities of outfits like Ebubeagu.
3. A forensic breakdown of “unknown gunmen” incidents, distinguishing criminality, political violence, and potential state-linked operations.
4. Renewed political engagement with legitimate grievances – moving beyond a security-only approach.
5. A leadership reset in the region – prioritising people’s safety over political gain.
In sum, insecurity in the Southeast is not the handiwork of one actor. It is the product of political failure, criminal infiltration, heavy-handed state responses, and deliberate narrative manipulation. Blaming only IPOB distorts reality and allows more dangerous forces to hide in the shadows.
To reclaim peace, the region must confront the full ecosystem of violence destabilising it. Only then can the Southeast begin the hard work of rebuilding trust, restoring justice, and securing a stable and prosperous future.
